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Summary 
The purpose of this research has been to develop indicators that can be used by the Ministry for the 
Environment to monitor what are referred to as additional dispute resolution processes permitted 
under the Resource Management Act. Sections 99(1)1 and 268(1)2 provide a basis for resolving 
disputes over resource consents, designations and heritage orders,· and water conservation orders 
using mediation, facilitation, conciliation or similar procedures. The research was not concerned 
with the option of arbitration as it is ilot based on consensus decision making. 
The differences between mediation, facilitation and conCiliation were clarified. Much of the 
literature on additional dispute resolution relates to mediation rather than to facilitation and 
conciliation, therefore aspects of mediation are referred to more frequently in this publication. The 
steps in a mediation process are described in Appendix 1. 
The legislative context in which additional dispute resolution is specifically referred to was outlined. 
It identified where the use of these processes are allowed for in the resource consent granting and 
appeal process in particular and with regard to the review of consent conditions, designations and 
heritage orders, and water conservation orders. 
Monitoring principles were selected after a review of the overseas li.terature 'on environmental 
dispute resolution and an examination of existing dispute resolution models in other fields in New 
Zealand. These included the Christchurch Community Mediation Service, the Employment 
Tribunal, and the Disputes Tribunal (formerly the Small Claims Tribunal) .. The principles chosen 
were: efficiency and cost-effectiveness, legitimacy, and fairness. No attempt was made to express 
principles or develop indicators that might be appropriate for Maori to use in evaluating a<Jditional 
dispute resolution processes. 
, . 
The pre-monitoring context was clarified before indicators were developed. That context related to 
the kinds of decisions that consent authorities would need to make with regard to choosing an 
appropriate dispute resolution path. The Ministry for the Environment would then be monitoring 
those instances where the choice had been made to use addi~ional dispute resolution processes. 
Separate guidelines were provided in Appendix 2 for consent authorities when selecting a dispute 
resolution path. It was recommended that a marginal analysis be undertaken of the expected costs 
and benefits of using additional dispute resolution processes when granting resource consents etc. 
The analysis would provide a comparison to the scenario of moving directly to hearings under ss.100 
or 272. 
Section 32 of the Resource Management Act was used. as an exemplar for assisting consent 
authorities to justify the process of considering alternative dispute resohition processes and for 
developing indicators. Indicatorswere developed using the concept of Pareto~efficiency. A benefit-
cost analysis approach- was used to monitor· cost-effectiveness rather than efficiency. Absolute 
1 "For the purpOse of clarifying, mediating or facilitating resolution of any matter of issue, a consent authority may, upon 
request or of its own motion, invite anyone who·has made an application for a resource consent or a SUbmission on 
an application to meet with each other or such other persons as· the authority thinks, fit." 
2 "At any time after lodgement of any proceedings, for the purpose of encouraging settlement, the Planning Tribunal, 
with the consen( of the parties and of its own motion or upon request, may ask one of its members or another person 
to conduct mediation, conciliation, or.other procedures designed to facilitate the resolution of any matter before or 
at any time during the course of a hearing." 
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efficiency cannot be calculated. Indicators aimed at monitoring the correlation of a number of 
factors that might improve the cost-effectiveness of dispute resolution ptbcesses were presented in 
Appendix 3. 
Indicators developed for the principle of legitimacy addressed two sets of issues: conforming with 
th~ law or legality, and the credibility of the process. Issues covered included: . confidentiality, 
voluntary involvement, privacy, and responsiveness of the process to the needs and interests of .the 
parties. 
Fairness indicators corresponded to different stages of the process. They addressed issues such as 
participation, representation (including that of third-party interests and future generations), settihg 
up process protocols, and access to information. 
Conclusions reached are as follows. 
An investigation should be carried out as to who would or should pay the costs.if someone bther 
than a Planning Tribunal member is appointed to mediate or conciliate under s.268. 
A potenv.al 'enhancement' benefit from adopting additional dispute resolution processes needs to 
be monitored. Benefit may accrue in instances where additional dispute resolution processes have 
served to clarify issues so that the time taken for a hearing is significantly 'reduced. 
If the costs and benefits of an additional dispute resolution process fall in different years they need 
to be measured using. a constant· $ value. There may also be difficulties in trying to collect 
information on actual costs an~ benefits incurred. 
The Ministry for the Environment should only attempt 'to monitor the cost-effectiveness of 
individual processes at present. A large number of outcomes will need to be recorded over a 
substantial period of time before an attempt can be made to. compare cases. It is not appropriate 
to attempt to compare the cost-effectiveness of additional dispute resolution processes with hearings. 
Third-party intervenors must be skilled and work within relevant codes of conduct that are 
eStablished by a relevant profeSSional body. These attributes apply both to consent authorities and 
to people appointed by the Planning Tiibunal. The Tribunal could appoint an appropriate person 
to bea permanent additional dispute resolution intervenor or a pool of, intervenors could be 
identified for. the Tribunal to draw from when necessary. 
The issues of confidentiality, privilege and protection against defamation for non-judicial intervenors 
need to be addressed in the legislation. 
Although the Act allows certain persons to appeal a resource consent authority decision (s.120), it 
is not clear whether the. provisions of s.274 that permit others to appear before the Tribunal might 
relate to participation under s.26RThis situation needs to be clarified .. 
Specially-appointed advocates could represent the third-party interests and those of future 
generations inherent in environmental disputes. Some meetings could also be made public. 
iv 
Recommendations 
1. That an investigation be carried out on who should pay the costs of a: non-Planning Tribunal 
intervenor under s.268 of the Act. 
2. That resource consent authorities be encouraged through the use of professional trainers to 
provide training opportunities for their staff ih facilitation, mediation and negotiation. 
3. That reference be made in the Act to the need for the skills, qualities and experience required 
of the intervenor under ss.99 and 268. 
4. That a pool of third-party intervenors be identified, updated and available for use by the 
Planning Tribunal under s.268of t!te Act. 
5. That the legislation be clarified with regard to who may participate under s.268: 
Further research 
Methods for guiding tpe weighting of principles are necessary. 
, . 
An on-going evaluation is needed of additional dispute resolution practice in New Zealand. A data 
base on mediation in New Zealand needs to be established by surveying those who have mediated 
their disputes both at the local authority and the Planning Tribunal levels .. '
Research into the issues related to who would/should pay for the intervenor under s.268 is required. 
Section 99 provides a valuable opportunity for cost-efficient dispute resolution. This opportunity 
could be captured if there· was a formal requirement in the Act for a dispute assessment at that 
stage. This issue warrants further research. 
There is a need for indicators to monitor whether additional dispute resolution outcomes are 
consistent with the purpose and principles of the Resource Management Act both now and in the 
future. 
v 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Scope of the publication and clarification of terms 
The Resource Management 'Act 19913 provides specific (ss.994 and 2685) opportunities for. 
'additiona1' dispute resolution processes to be used dutipg the resource consent application and 
appeal process. These processes are intended to complement existing procedures such as iocal 
authority and Planning Tribunal hearings for resolving environmental and resource management 
disputes rather than providing altenlatives. The intention of the Act is to provide opportunities for 
reducing or avoiding lhe need for litigation. 
These new approaches are referred to as 'alternative dispute resolution' (ADR) or 'environmental 
dispute settlement' (EDS) in thditerature. The term 'alternative' reflects the ADR philosophy that . 
the approaches are different to conventional institutionalised forms of dispute resolution. Howeve;', 
the term 'additional dispute resolution' will be used in this publication to be consistent with the 
t~rm adopted in s.268(1) of the Act 
Alternative or 'additiona1' dispute resolution refers to a variety of consensual approaches to 
resolving public disputes. The parties meet face-to-face in an effort to reach a mutually acceptable 
resolution of issues or potential controversies. The processes are voluntary; and involve joint 
problem solving and/or negotiation (Bingham, 1986, p.5) .. 
The processes referred to in ss.99 and 268 (mediation, facilitation and conciliation) have not been 
defined or interpreted in Part I of the Act. They all belong to a category of additional dispute 
resolution that is sometimes referred to as 'assisted negotiation' which implies the intervention of 
a neutral third party. These proCesses may be used when parties are unable to reach agreement after 
negotiating on their own. . . 
Two or more parties are assisted by im intermediary(ies) to negotiate issues of concern to them. At 
various points in a dispute the parties may require f<;lcilitation, mediation or conciliation assistance; 
the intenriediary may call these different techniques into play at different times depeni:ling on the 
situation. The parties contribute to the development of the process and control the outcome. 
Facilitation is the simplest form of third-party intervention. An intermediary can play a vital role 
in enabling negotiations to begin and helping them to continue. The facilitator focuses almost solely 
on managing the process rather than on volunteering his or her own ideas. He or she is concerned 
with the practical and procedural aspects of meetip:gs as well as using differ:ent techniques to 
enhance communication between or amongst the parties. A skilled facilitator will also work to 
3 The Resource Management Act 1991 is referred to as 'the Act' forthwith. Any other legislation is referred to in full. 
4 "For the purpoSe of clarifying, mediating or facilitating resolution of any matter of issue, a consent authority may, upon 
request or of its own motion, invite anyone who has made an application for a resource consent or a submission on 
an application to meet with each other or such other persons as the authority thinks fit." 
5 "At any time after lodgement of any proceedings, for the purpose of encouraging settlement, the Planning Tribunal, 
with the consent of the parties and of its own motion or upon request, may ask one of its members or another persOn 
to conduct mediation, conciliation, or other procedures deSigned to facilitate the resolution of any matter before or 
at any time during the course of a hearing." 
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create a favourable climate for joint problem solving (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, pp.152-162). 
Facilitation is also useful in dealing with intra-party ·conflict before mediation actually begins 
(Ministry for the Environment, 1988, p.19).6 
Mediation operates in a climate of conflict whereas facilitation does not require conflict. Steps in 
the mediation. process are described in Appendix 1. Mediation involves an impartia.l 
intermedia. ry(ies) who is (are) acceptable to all the parties. This person's involvement is 
considerably more substantial tl1an -in facilitation. He or she is often privy to information given in 
confidence by the parties. The mediator may caucus with the parties when necessary and in some 
situations may perform what is popularly referred to as 'shuttle diplomacy' in international 
negotiations .. By acting as a repository f<:>r such information, the mediator is in" a unique position 
to suggest options that any one party would be unable to suggest from a limited amount of 
information. A skilled mediator will ensure that he or she has a good knowledge of the substantive 
issues that concefI). each party. He or she will then be well placed to understand what each party 
may be willing to trade and what is probably non-negotiable (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, 
pp.162-164). The final outcome of mediation may be a clarification of some or all ofthe issues, the 
making of a recommendation to some higher authority, or reaching agreement on a particular course 
of action. Success may also be in the form of improved communication between or amorigst the 
. parties.7 ' . 
(The definition of mediation outlined here is not necessarily the same as that used in~ for example, 
family courts, tenancy mediation, community mediation and industrial mediation. Mediation in 
those arenas may span a spectrum from facilitation to arbitration (Cameron, J., 1992, Senior 
Lecturer, Department of Sociology, University of Canterbury, pers. comm.) .. The concept of 
. mediation in the environmental dispute resolution field has been shaped largely in the industrial 
relations field (Bingham, 1986, p.162).) . , 
The term conciliation is not referred ·to in the major literature on environmental dispute resolution; 
it appears to be used mainly in the industrial relations field. In that arena the major role of a 
Conciliator is "to. convene conciliation councils for the hearing of disputes of interest and to take 
such steps as he""deems advisable with intent to procure fair and amicable voluntary settlements of 
such disputes" (Woods (1963) cited in Howells and Cathro, 1986, p.14). A conciliator acts as a 
neutral third party and assists the disputants by guiding, exploring, interpreting, advising, an~ 
cajoling to settle their own disputes and to reach their own agreement.· . 
. . 
I have made the assumption that the use of the words "conciliation and other procedures" in s.268 
reflects an attempt to empower whatever concept or form of consensus decision making the parties 
wish to use rather than imposing technical distinctions. This publication is not concerned with the 
option of arbitration allowed under s.356. Arbitration generally involves an enforceable decision 
being imposed on the parties (Hearn, 1987, p.101); it js not based on consensus decision making. 
It is important to note here that local government staff have been practising facilitation extensively 
under the legislation preceding the Act; the legislative provisions for mediation and conciliation are 
the real 'newcomers'. . . 
6 See footnote 54 in Susskind, 1981, p.19, for cases involving facilitation. 
7 See Bingham (1986), Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), Sullivan (1984), Bacow and Wheeler (1984), and Talbot (1983) 
for examples of mediated disputes. Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990) provide exam.Ples of disputes that illustrate both 
facilitation and mediation. 
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1.2 Purpose and approach 
The Minister for the Environment is required to monitor, amongst other things, the effect and 
implementation of the Act (s.24 (f)). The Ministry will also be concerned to avoid, where possible, 
the problems experienced in North America where additional dispute resolution has been practised 
on an ad hoc basis (Ministry for the Environment, 1988, pp.13, 38). 
The Ministry for the Environment needs specific criteria and indicators with which to monitor the 
effectiveness of processes described above. This will enable policy and procedure appropriate to 
ad.ditional dispute I,'esolutidn processes to develop in New Zealand. The objective of this research 
is to provide guidelines for monitoring additional dispute resolution processes as permitted under 
the Resource Management Act. The discussion of issues relating to indicators will also assist local 
authorities to examine certain factors before making a decision to use one process or another . 
. The research approach comprises three components. First, the opportunities for using these 
processes under the Act have been outlined. Second, the core principles on which monitoring 
should be based have been derived after (a) a review of the North American literature on 
approaches to monitorfng additional dispute resolution processes used in resource management 
disputes, and (b) an examination of dispute resolution models used in New Zealand such as 
community mediation services, industrial relations, and the disputes tribunals. Although the North 
American experiences may be different because their judicial system is different to New Zealand's, 
the philosophy underlying the principles of additional dispute resolution is likely to be relevant. 
Third, attributes or characteristics of these principles have been identified and relevant monitoring 
indicators developed. 
3 
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CHAPTER 2 
Legislative context 
2.1 Additional dispute resolution processes in the Resource Management Act 
. In the Resource Management Act the following sections provide a basis for additional dispute 
resolution. 
Section 99(1) Pre-hearing Meetings states that "(t)or the purpose of clarifying, mediating or 
facilitating resolution of any matter of issue, a.consent authority may, upon request or of its own 
motion; invite anyone who has made an application for a resource consent or a submission on an 
application to meet with each other or such other persons as the authority thinks fit". This applies 
to s.88 with regard to making an application for a resource consent unders.94(1)(c)(ii) regarding 
. controlled activities, s.94(2)(b) regarding discretionary or non-complying activities, s.94(3)(c) 
regarding restrictions relating to coastal marine areas, lakes of beds and rivers, water, and discharge 
of contaminants into the environment, s.128 with regard to review of consent conditions, and ss.169 
and 209 regarding deSignations and heritage orders., and water conservation orders. 
Section 268(1) Additional Dispute Resolution'state~ that "(a)tany"time after lodgement of any 
proceedings, for the purpose of encouraging settlement,Jhe Planning Tribunal, with the consent of 
the parties and of its own motion or upon request; may ask one of its members or another person 
to conduct mediation, cOnciliation, or other procedures designed to facilitate the resolution of any 
matter before or at any time during the course of a hearing,j. 
Additional dispute resolution processes can alsoJ)e.used voluntarily as part of the consultation 
required under the First Schedule of the Act tn the, pr~paration, change and, review of policy 
statements and plans' (Part V of the Act). 
2.2 Resource consent granting and appeal processes 
The following description of the steps involved in the resource' consent application, granting and 
appeal process under the Resource Management Act is illustralcd in Figure 2.l. The shaded boxes 
illustrate the pOints at which decisions must be made as to the appropriate dispute resolution 
process to be used in anyone case. 
A resource consent application is made under s.88 and submissions are called for (s.96) if the 
, application has been notified in accordance with s.93. (An application may be called in under s.14O 
if the application is of national significance and the decision is made by the Minister.) Under s.99 / 
there is an opportunity for issues to be resolved or clarified using mediation or facilitation. 
The parties involved need to agree on whether a pre-hearing meeting could assist in resolving the . 
issues in the hope that a resource consent authOrity hearing (S.l00) could be avoided or at least the 
issues Could be clarified and the hearing time needed reduced. In the event that an agreement is 
made to have a pre-hearing meeting the choice must be made between mediation and facilitation. 
Chapter Four will address issues relating to this' choi~. 
5 
. 8094 Further 
Infonnallon 
required 
R 
R 
Application for 
resource consent 
8093 Nollficallon of 
application 
8096 . Call for submJsSloDS 
80100 Consent authority . 
hearing 
80120 Appeal to Planning 
Tribunal of consent 
and authority' decision 
s.2n Planning Tribunal 
hearing 
. Appeal to High COurt 
on quesllon or law 
s.308 Appeal to Court or 
Appeal 
8094 Applications not 
requiring notffication 
80140 Minister's call-In 
1-----+1 powers for applications 
of national Importance 
Figure 2.1 Resource consent granting and appeal process. 
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Consent authorities have already been using facilitation to address conflict before hearings and are 
likely to continue to do this in most cases. However, if it appears that a major dispute is likely to 
emerge involving, for example, contamination by discharge the authority may recommend bringing 
in a professional facilitator or mediator to assist. . 
Several outcomes are possible at this stage. One outcome is that agreement is reached by the parties 
involved as to whether the resource consent should be allowed or disallowed, and the provisions that 
might be attached. On the other hand, agreement may not be reached, and the dispute may proceed 
to a Council hearing under s.lDO of the Act. In this instance the issues may be clarified and the 
hearing time potentially reduced. 
The consent authority's decision may be appealed to the Planning Tribun~l unders.120. If that is 
the case, there is the opportunity for mediation, conciliation or other procedures to be used to 
facilitate the resolution of. any IIlatters before the Tribunal at any time after lodgment of any 
proceedings before or at any time during the. course of a hearing (s.268). It is important to stress 
that by contrast with s.99 (pre-hearing meetings), s.268 procedures can only be invoked if all the 
parties agree, and in many instances that may involve a large number of people. The Tribunal also 
qm exercise discretion in this decision. 
7 
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CHAPTER 3 
Core principles for monitoring 
The purpose of this Chapter is to look at principles that are relevant to the monitoring and 
evaluation of additional dispute resolution processes in the resource management field, and the 
principles used to monitor and evaluate other New Zealand models of additional dispute resolution. 
As more information is available on mediation than on facilitation and conciliation, the literature 
on mediation has been drawn on most extensively in this publication. 
3.1· Principles identified in environmental mediation in North America 
During the Resource Management Law Reform process jane Chart, Senior Lecturer in Law, 
University of Canterbury, was invited· by the Ministry for the Environment to contribute to the 
debate on the introduction of mediation as a means of settling disputes in toe environmental· and 
natural resource field. Chart's paper, based on her knowledge of mediation in the United States, 
has provided a starting point from which to identify core principles. 
Chart emphasises that public perceptions of the process will influence the willingness of potential 
participants to consider mediation as a means of resolving resource management conflicts. "In 
practice, the extent to which mediation can om;r the benefits. suggested (in a previous section) is 
likely to depend on public perceptions of the legitimacy and fairness of the process" (Ministry for 
the Environment, 1988, p.8). Fairness of the process should result in an outcome that is perceived 
by the wider public to be fair. 
Further, "(f)ailure to address legitimacy and fairness Objectives is also likely to result in a less 
cost-efficient process than might otherwise be possible. For example, outcomes which are widely 
seen as having been achieved through a legitimate, fair process (e.g., all those affected participate, 
mediator impartial etc.) are more likely to be sustainable over the long-term" (Ibid., p.9): , 
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, pp.21-33) identify four characteristics of a good settlement: 
fairness, efficiency, wisdom, and stability. In order to evaluate the fairness of an outcome, they 
discuss the need to evaluate the fairness of the process. This evaluation includes issues such as the 
. opportunities available for participation, the. nature of the participation etc. 
Although a mediation process may be fair and legitimate, they argue that it is unacceptable if the 
agreement takes an inordinate amount of time to achieve, or if it costs much more than it should. 
The process is also inefficient if it takes much longer to achieve a slightly fairer outcome than could 
have been achieved in the absence of consensus (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.26). 
From the perspective of Goldqerg et al. J1985, p.7) "an effective dispute resolution mechanism is 
one that is inexpensive, speedy and leads to a final resolution of the dispute. At the same time it· 
should be procedurally fair, efficient (in the sense of leading to optimal SOlutions), and satisfying to 
the parties". Bingham (1986, p.68) states that parties care about the fairness, legitimacy, arid 
efficiency of the process. . 
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3.2 Principles identified in New Zealand models of additional dispute resolution 
The Christchurch Community Mediation Service was evaluated on the basis .of legitimacy, quality 
of justice, cost-effectiveness, and speed/immediacy (Cameron and Kirk, 1986, pp.118-136). These 
principles were selected for the following reasons. LegitimacY"'was reflected in the need for the 
Service to have its own enabling legislation, that is, to be recognised in law. An examination of the 
Service's economic efficiency was needed fo help decision makers decide whether to continue to 
provide funding. Success in providing a means of dispute resolution as well as access to justice 
indicated the quality of justice being provided by the Service. 
Mediation, conCiliation and arbitration have been used extensively in the field of industrial relations. 
One of the objects of s.76 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 has been to establish "(a) low 
level, informal, specialist Employment Tribun~1 to provide a speedy, fair and just resolution of 
differences between parties to employment contracts .. ;." .. The functions of the Tribunal (s.78) are 
to assist parties "by facilitating resolution of differences ... ", and to "(p)rovide mediation assistance 
in order to facilitate agreed settlement of differences .... ". 
Oxley (1986) has carried out an extensive evaluation of the Small Claims Tribunal (now called the 
Disputes Tribunal)in New Zealand; "The primary function of the Tribunal agreed settlement" is 
to attempt to bring the parties to a dispute to an agreed settlement (s:15, Small Claims Tribunals 
Act 1976). The goals of the Tribunal have been to provide a low cost, speedy and fair service to the 
public. The service has been evaluated in terms of its record in providing justice for the ordinary 
persc)ll. 
3.3 Ta~ata whenua principles 
For a discussion on Maori experience of additional dispute resolution readers are referred to 
Blackford and Matunga (1991). No attempt was made to develop indicators for monitoring 
. additional dispute resolution processes from a Maori perspective; this work fould be done by Maori 
researchers if there is a need to do so. . 
, 
. 3.4 Principles for monitoring 
Although the core principles for additional dispute resolution have been expressed in different ways 
in both environmental mediation as it is pi:actised in North America, and. in the. community 
mediation, industrial relations, small claims, and family courts models used in New Zealand, they· 
can be aggregatel;l into a few broad categories. It seems reasonable to adopt the principles of 
legitimacy, fairness and efficiency and cost-effectiveness from which to develop monitoring indicators 
for additional dispute resolution processes as provided for in the Resource Management Act. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Indicators for monitoring 
The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the characteristics of and issues relating to each of the 
principles for monitoring the process derived in Chapter Three. These principles are efficiency/cost- . 
effectiveness, legitimacy and fairness. Indicators are. developed for determining how these 
characteristics and issues are handled and in turri, therefore, whether or not the principles are 
observed. Indicators are pieces of descriptive information that can be used to measure changes over 
time. 
4.1 Efficiency/cost-effectiveness 
4.1.1' The pre-monitoring context 
Indicators enable us to monitor events that have already taken place. Before attempting to develop 
indicators we need to clarify the pre-monitoring context. Readers are referred to Chapter Two and 
to Figure 2.1 in particular. The points at which decisions need to be made on the choice of dispute 
resolution process are illustrated by shaded boxes. The Ministry for the Environment will be 
monitoring in an ex-post way instances where resource consent authorities have chosen to use 
additional dispute resolution processes. . 
. Resource consent authorities may need guidance in choosing a cost-effective dispute resolution path 
that will be monitored by the Ministry. As thereis no specific guidance in the Act we propose s32 
as an exemplar for considering the principles of cost-effectiveness and efficiency. Section 32 requires 
the Ministers for the Environment and of Conservation as well as every local authority to evaluate 
the likely benefits and Costs of the principal alternative means of adopting objectives or policy (and· 
the likely implementation and compliance costs) in order to achieve the purpose of the Act. In 
addition they must "be satisfied that any such objective, policy, ru,le, or other method .... is the most 
appropriate means of exercising the function; having regard to its efficiency and effectiveness relative 
to other means". 
Guidelines for resou,rce consent authorities when selecting a dispute resolution path are presented 
more fully in Appendix 2. The proposed method involves l!. marginal analysis of the expected costs 
and benefits of each additional dispute resolution process available relative to the scenario of moving 
directly to hearings underss.l00, or 272. 
4.1.2 Cost-effectiveness v. effICiency 
The concept of efficiency has not been defined in the Act. For the purpose of this work indicators 
have been developed within the concept of Paret08 efficiency, that is, a measure of efficiency from 
a societal perspect~ve. Indicators need to be specific to the efficient use of public and private 
8 A Pareto-efficient solution is achieve'd when all changes (Pareto-improvements) make. one individual better off 
without hurting anyone else (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1979, p.441), An efficient frontier or Pareto optimal 
frontier is defined as "the locus of achievable joint evaluations from which no joint gains are pOssible" (Raifa, 1982, 
p.139). . . ". '. 
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resources in the pfGvision of additional dispute resolution opportunities. The position is considered 
to be Pareto efficient where no other options provide additional nett benefits to society.9 
. . 
The method of choosing a dispute resolution path recommended in the section aboye and explored 
in Appendix 2 is used to maximise the cost-effectiveness of the option selected and as a proxy of 
Pareto efficiency, recognising that non-monetary values are not factored into the calculation. If the 
most cost-effective option is adopted, that is, the one demonstrating the maximum expected 
benefit/cost ratio, we are approaching Pareto optimality and the option shou.ld therefore be the most 
efficient. It is more appropriate to aim for cost-effective processes as absolute efficiency cannot be 
ailculated. . 
, 4.1.3 Benefll-cost anaiysis 
A benefit-cost analysis approach has also been used to develop monitoring indicators. These 
indicators will assist the Ministry for the Environment to see if additional dispute resolution 
processes are achieving agreements in a cost-effective manner. . 
The first step in assessing the cost-effectiveness of a process is to calculate the actual total costs and 
benefits. incurred by all the parties. Tables 2,. 3, 5 and 6 in Appendix 2 list the kinds of costs and 
benefits likely to be incurred. '. 
. The cost of the intervenor may vary depending on whether facilitation, mediation or conciliation was 
used. A mediator would presumably have carried out a dispute assessment and this· requires 
resources, time, and skilled personal to work with' the parties and to provide technical information. 
However, there is no formal requirement for a disp.ute assessment to be carried out. Costs may also 
. vary depending on whether a consent authority staff representative may have facilitated or a 
professional intervenor may have been called in under s.99 (pre-hearing) . 
. Under s.268 the costs for the intervenor may differ depending on whether a judge 
mediated/conciliated or whether a professional intervenor was inVited "to assist. In the event that 
a Planning Tribunal member chose to invite a non-member intervenor to be involved,a decision 
would have been made as to who should pay for the intervenor. At the time of writing this issue 
had not been tested. . 
If the dispute was complex or there was a large. degree of polarisation between or amongst the 
parties initially the intervenor may have needed assistance to manage the information gathering for 
example. The negotiators may have required training' in order to negotiate effectively . 
.... 
The following factors therefore need to be taken into account when determining' the cost of the 
intervenor: 
did the intervenor require paid assistance to manage the information gathering etc.? 
was the dispute in litigation? 
. what costs were involved in the training of representatives? 
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what was the total cost of the intermediary'S fee and expenses? . 
For those who are interested, Raiffa (1982, pp.133-165) describes how negotiating parties Can find an efficient 
frontier for negotiations over cost and time. 
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When the costs have been determined the total costs incurred by all the parties need to be summed. 
At this stage it not possible to specify the costs incurred with conciliation as there is no experience 
in the environmental field to give any guidance. 
Benefits are represented as cost savings of not having to proceed to a hearing under ss.l00 or 272 
of the Act. The kinds of costs saved are shown in Tables 1 and 4 of Appendix 2. These include the 
daily fees and travel allowances for Council members to attend hearings, as well as staff 
administration costs (s.l00). If the dispute is not resolved there may still have been as,aving of some 
costs if issues are clarified and reduce the time necessary for the hearing. This potential for an 
'enhanced' hearing situation needs to be monitored over time to see whether'it should be inclu<;led 
in the list of benefits achieved. If mediation or conciliation are used to resolve a dispute before or 
during a Planning Tribunal hearing savings are represented as avoiding some or all of the costs of 
.a hearing. These Costs include providing evidence, witness fees,. legal advice,producing documents, 
etc. 
Relevant questions to be asked When assessing benefits include: 
how many Council'members would have been involved? 
how many Council staff would have been required for administration?, 
what was the potential cost of providing evidence? 
what was the potential cost of witness fees? 
what was the potential cost of legal advice? etc. 
From a Pareto perspective it is unacceptable if the agreement takes an inordinate amount oftime 
to achieve, or if it costs much more than it should have. The process is also inefficientifit takes . 
much longer to achieve a slightly fairer outcome tllancould . have resulted in the absence of 
consensus (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.26). For this reason we want to be able to measure 
 . 
the. costs and benefits incurred in relation to the time taken over the process. 
The next step in calculating the cost-effectiveness of a process is to measure the duration of that· 
process. The first step is .to select beginning- and end-points. A number of different beginnings 
could be chosen: the date that the intervenor was first contacted, the date that the dispute 
assessment was completed, the date of theJirslmeeting or some other point where the intermediary 
begins to provide assistance to the parties. The end-point c()uld. be the date of the last meeting, .or 
10 Readers are reminded that the analysis focuses on process costs only; it does not include costs of borrOwing 
funds for development,. for example. 
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the date on which an agreement was signed or ratified (Bingham, 1986, p~140). The former allows 
for cases in which the parties failed to agree to be included. 
As in tourt processes, additional dispute resolution processes may take a long time if the issues are 
complex. According to Bingham (Ibid., p.129) "(i)t mayb-e unrealistic to begin counting the costs 
of mediation at the time that the parties agreed to negotiate, if the previous period of contention, 
litigation~ or clarification of relative power contributed to the parties' willingness to negotiate a 
voluiltary settlement". This point is of particular relevance in the case where mediation or 
conciliation is used during a Plamiing Tribunal ~earing as allowed under s.268. 
Ifit is found that costs and benefits fall in different financial years, costs and benefits need to be 
measured using a $ value that is constant. This can be done either by discounting future costs and 
benefits (at a public sector rate of 10% presumably) or inflating past costs and benefits from a 
particular point in time. 
A cost-effective process is one where the ben~fit-cost ratio is greater than one. 
4.1.4 Increasing the probability of benefits of additional dispute resolution . 
. It may be tempting to compa.re the use of hearings with additIonal dispute resolution to see if one 
process is more cost-effective than another. In her evaluation of a decade of experience in resolving 
environmental disputes in the United States, Bingham (1986, pp.127-147) cautions against misleading 
claims that additional dispute resolution is cheaper and faster than litigation. No systematic attempt 
has been made to test these claims; there is little evidence available on the time it takes to resolve 
disputes using litigation or additional dispute resolution· processes, and there are also a number of 
conceptual problems in trying to make comparisons. The lack of parallel data makes a general 
comparison difficult. 
Too few similar cases have been mediated and litigated (gone to hearing) to find a large enough 
sample to remove the effects of case variability. However, in the future it might be possible to find 
corre'tations between particular characteristics and the dispute resolution processes used using a 
qualitative process rather than a quantitative one: Examples of these characteristics include whether 
cases went all the way to trial (hearing), whether disputes at trial (hearing) were resolved using 
additional dispute resolution, and whether additionill dispute resolution was used before or after 
cases were filed for trial (hearing) (Ibid ... p.132). 
A number of other characteristics could also be monitored over time to see whether they increase 
the probability of increased benefits using additional dispute resolution processes. After interviewin~ 
participants we can monitor the benefits achieved and incorporate them into other scenarios. Those 
characteristics could include whether a dispute assessment was carried out, the complexity of the 
. dispute and the number of mediator assistants (information management, for example) thus required, 
and\vhether there is a relationship between the speed at which agreement is reached and th~ type 
of interVention used. Over time it may also be found that different classes or categories of dispute, 
for example,can be resolved more efficiently than others (e.g. number and types of parties, r.esource 
issue etc.) using a particular dispute resolution process (see Appendix 3). 
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Although the costs and benefits of using additional dispute resolution p'rocesses can be quantified 
in general tenus, the realisation of benefits depends on the willingness of all the parties to be 
involved. Parties will need to be convinced that whatever process they choose it is likely to be both 
legitimate and fair. This is particularly important for mediation where the intervenor plays a 
substantial role. 
4.2 Legitimacy 
Two sets of issues are discussed in this section; the first pertains to Conforming wIth law or legality 
while the second is concerned with the credibility of processes. 
4.2.1 Conforming with the law or legality 
A legitimate process is one that conforms with the law or legality. The Reso~rce ManagementAct 
provides the legislative basis for the use of additional dispute resolution processes (see Section 1.1) 
and some basic guidelines on participation. 
Cameron and Kirk (1986; pp;118, 124) found that some of those interviewed about the Christchurch 
Community Mediation Service believe that processes such as mediation' can be legitimate if they 
have a legislative ·basis. Legislation can confer legal protection, credibility and' professional 
assurance. ISsues such as confidentiality, privilege and protection against defamation were covered 
by the Community Mediation Service (Pilot Project) Act 1983. 
The issue, of confidentiality on the part of the third-party intervenor is intrinsic to the philosophy 
of mediation. An intervenor is usuaily called in because parties have, been unable to negotiate a 
dispute without assistance; the dispute may be very complex or the parties may need someone to 
help with devising and presenting options. The intervenor has to be relied upon not to disclose 
information that is confidential to individual parties. Information may be commercially-sensitive, 
for example, or parties may feel uneasy about openly putting forward a particular option. By being 
privy to such information the intervenor can suggest potential trades in values without violating the 
confiden~ of the participants. He or she is in' a position to propose possible' options that the 
parties themselveS would not' have been able to fashion alone (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, ' 
pp.146-147, 162-163). ' '. 
A Planning Judgemediating under s.268 of the Act is required (as a District Court Judge) to til:ke 
the bath of Allegi~mceand the Judicial Oath under the Oaths and Declarations Act 1957. He or 
she is also subject to the ethical codes' of his Or her profession. However, 'Planning Tribunal 
members may not want to be mediators if they have to inVOlve themselves to the extent implied in 
Section 1.1. .They may also not have the appropriate training and experience. A person other than 
a Planning Tribunal member appointed to mediate would not be required to take these oaths nor 
. would he or she necessarily be guided in their professional conduct. . 
Non-jUdicial intervenors are also not protected legally under the Act: The implication of this lack 
of protection is that an intervenor may be called to give' evidence over information given in 
confidence by one of the parties. 
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4.2.2 9redibility of the process 
The remaining issues in this Section are not addressed specifically in the Act but are likely to affect 
the perceptions of those involved as to the credibility of the process and therefore influence future 
use of these processes. These issues include the voluntary nature of participation, private v. open 
meetings, and the capacity of the process to meet the needs arid interests of the parties. 
A process must be perceived to be legitimate both before it begins and after it has ended. The 
success of these processes, partiqdarly mediation, is dependent on participation being wholly 
voluntary.' Participation is voluntary. under the Act but there is a need to be vigilant that parties 
are not coerced into participatiog. Parties shoul<i not feel that they have been 'taken advantage of, 
manipulated or co-opted (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.25). 
The fact that mediation is often conducted in private means that much of what goes on is not open 
· to public scrutiny .. Oxley (1986, pp.59-61) reports that most of those responding to the Small Claims 
Tribunal evaluation believed that privacy is important because matters being debated and resolved 
were private. However, the issue of legitimacy could be raised over the public interest aspect of 
environmental disputes. Agreement maybe reached by the parties involved, but public or third-party 
interests may not have been considered. (It should be noted that in using additional dispute 
resolution approaches parties are helped to focus on their needs and interests rather than on 
· producing evidence to support a predetermined outcome or position.), . 
There is no widespread agreement that the process of environmental dispute resolution should be 
private although many would argue that it is essential for parties to be able to reach a compromise 
· (Ministry for the Environment, 1988, p.21). Parties do not want to be seen to be weak or to lose 
face; they may be prepared to compromise ina private meeting while still being able to maintain 
a more intransigent public stance. Selected meetings could be made open to the public (Susskind, 
1981, p.44) to attend in a non-speaking capacity. . 
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A legitimate process is also one that has the capacity to respond to the needs and interests' of the 
parties. Issues include the group's decision in selecting an intervenor - whether they were given a 
range of people to choose from - and whether the cultural needs of the parties (see Blackford and 
Matunga, 1991) were recognised and built into the process. 
4.3 Fairness 
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987,.p.21) present a number of questions that can be asked to evaluate 
the fairness of the process by which resolution was reached. Examples of these questions are: 
" * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Was the process open to public scrutiny? 
Were all the groups who wanted to participate given an adequate chance to do so? 
Were all parties given access to the technical information they needed? 
Was everyone given an opportunity to express his or her views? 
Were the people involved accountable to the constituencies they ostensibly 
represented ?" 
These questions suggest that indicators of 'fairness' can be derived for. the different phases or stages 
in the dispute resolutIon process (see Appendix 1). They address issues such as participation, 
representation, setting up process protocols, access to information, etc. The degree of fairness of 
a process is determined in large part in the, pre-negotiation phase when guidelines are established 
for subsequent phases. ' . 
4.3.1 Participation 
Section 93 of the Act sets out guidelines as to who should be notified about an application for a 
resource consent. Section 99 states that all those who made submissions can be invited to meet with 
the applicant. 
One potential difficulty could emerge with regard to participation as it relates to the principle of 
fairness. Section 120 of the Act allows only those who made submissions under ss.96, 130, 169, and 
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209 to appeal a local authority decision. However, s.274(2) does allow those who are not party to 
the proceedings to appear at a Planning Tribunal hearing but it is not clear whether this section 
could also apply to s.268 (additional dispute resolution). One of the principles of additional dispute 
resolution states that all those affected by any decisions made need to be included i.e. those 
identified in s.93,for example, so that subsequent agreements ate not undermined. If all affected 
interests participate, there is a greater' chance of securing sustainable. outcomes and pUblic 
acceptance:that the process was fair (Ministry for the Environment, 1988, p.1S). 
Third-party/public interests as well as the interests of future. generations are also affected interests . 
. Resource consents, designations, etc. have to be considered in relation to a regional or district plan 
that encompasses third-partY interests. The purpose of the Act (s.5(2)(A» requires that the 
potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals)' be sustained to meet the reasonably 
foreseeable needs of future generations. 
There are a number of ways of dealing with unrepresented public interests. One option is to hold 
the mediator accountable' for the impact an agreement may have on uiuepresented parties although 
this is not a fav()ured one. A preferred option is the direct involvement of regulatory agencies 
whose presence would not only protect affected public interests but could also contribute specialist 
expertise. Department of Conservation representatives could act as 'guardians' or advocates of 
particular interests (Ministry for' the Environment, .1988, pp.17-"18). 
A third option is to open agreements for Pllblic scrutiny before they are ratified in some form 
(Pavelka, G. 1992, Centre for Resolving Environmental Disputes, Lincoln University,pers. comm.) 
though this may not always be appropriate as reporting provisions vary in the Act (see ss.99(3), 114, 
and 297). .. 
. . 
. No guidelines are given in the Act as to -how local authorities are to represent the needs of future 
generations. An advocate Could be specially appointed to this role. 
A recent inquiry into public needs for . legal services found that current legal services, including 
environmental and planning services, .offer limited access to justice for some sections of the 
community. Reasons for this inCluded ignorance, CostS and the intimidating nature of proceedings 
(Advisory Committee on Legal Services, 1986, pp.86-87). A 'fair' process is one where resources 
were available to enable all affected parties to participate. The Legal Services Act 1991 (s.19(k» 
provides limited opportunities for the granting of civil legal aid in specified instances in the making 
of all applications, submissions and appeals under the Resource Management Act. It is not clear 
how this might apply to the use of additiona~ dispute resolution. 
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4.3.2 Representation 
The process. of selecting representatives/negotiators should be "carried out by the parties themselves. 
The people involved need to be accountable to the constituencies they ostensibly represent so that 
agreements are not undermined later. Splinter groups may claim that their interests wete not 
represented or that the representatives did not have the authoritative consent of their constituents. 
The intervenor may assist local community interests to look for an existing body to represent their 
interests (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.25). Representatives will also want sufficient 
opportunities to express their views. Protocols can be established to ensure that opportunities occur. 
4.3.3 Access to itiformation 
All parties need to have access to technical information and resources to participate effectively. The 
inteivenor may set up a resource pool for joint information-gathering. 
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CHAPTERS 
Conclusions, recommendations and future research 
5.1 Conclusions 
Monitoring indicators were developed for the principles of efficiency/cost-effectiveness, legitimacy 
and fairness. Although the principles were expressed in different ways in both the overseas literature 
and in the literature on other models of additional dispute resolution in New Zealand, they were 
able to be aggregated into a few broad categories. Much of the additional dispute resolution 
literature is on mediation rather than facilitation or conciliation and so the mediation literature was 
drawn on most heavily. No attempt was made to develop indicators for monitoring additional 
dispute resolution processes from a Maori perspective; this work could be done by Maori 
researchers if there is a need to do so. 
The Ministry for the Environment will be monitoring additional dispute resolution in an ex-post way. 
In order to develop indicators it was necessary to clarify the pre-monitoring context. That context 
is represented by the decisions consent authorities have to make about the choice of a dispute 
resolution option. No specific guidance is given in the Act as to how choices could or should be 
made so we proposed s.32 a.s an exemplar for considering principles of cost-efficiency and efficiency. 
Indicators were developed within the concept of Pareto efficiency. Although the literature suggested 
that efficiency and cost-effectiveness were appropriate monitoring principles we decided that it is 
more appropriate to aim for cost-effectiveness rather than efficiency as absolute efficiency cannot 
be calculated. 
One issue that emerged in determining actual costs incurred was the lack of clarity as to who would 
or should pay the costs if someone other than a Planning Tribunal member is appointed to mediate" 
or conciliate under s.268. The Tribunal does not know and it is unlikely that anyone else is certain. 
The costs could be shared by the parties with thePI~nning Tribunal making a contribution according 
to a specified formula. The justification for this proposition is that savings can ostensibly be made 
to Vote:Justice through the use of these additional procedures. An investigation is needed into this 
issue. 
A second issue relating to costs was that it is not possible to specify the· costs incurred with 
conciliation as there has been no experience of that practice within the environmental dispute 
resolution field. . 
A potential 'enhancement' benefit generated by additional dispute resolution processes needs to be 
monitored over time. Benefit may accrue in instances where additional dispute resolution processes 
have not resulted in resolution but have served to clarify issues to the extent that the time taken for 
a hearing to be completed is significantly reduced. The negotiations associated with Electricorp's 
water right applications for the Waitaki power development is a good example (France, p.16, 1991). 
If the costs and benefits of an additional dispute resolution "process fall in different years they need 
to be measured using a constant $ value. " 
" One problem associated with monitoring the cost-effectiveness of these processes is the uncertainty 
of being able to collect information on the total costs and benefits involved. The cost of collecting 
that information may be too great, or alternatively parties may be unwilling to disclose information 
they would rather keep confidential. 
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A number of questions arise as to how the Ministry for the ,Environment might use the information 
collected through monitoring, particularly with regard to the issue of cost-effectiveness. Initially the 
Ministry will be able to monitor whether individual cases of additional dispute resolution have been 
cost-effectiye processes. However, a large number of qutcomes will need to be recorded over a 
substantial period of ~ime before an attempt can be made to compare ca'ses. Variables need to be 
kept constant to enable a compatison to be made, but the nature of different disputes cannot be 
adjusted to a comparable baseline. 
It was conduded that it is not appropriate at this stage to attempt to compare the efficiency of 
additional dispute resolution processes with hearings. Even after a decade of experience in the USA 
there were, too few similar cases of mediation and litigation to establish a large enough sample to 
remove the effects of case variability. However, a number of monitoring indicators were developed 
to assist the identification of correlations between various characteristics and the dispute resolution 
process used. ' 
The indicators developed, for legitimacy take into account issues that relate both to processes 
conforming with the law and legality, and to the credibility of these processes in the eyes of the 
participants. The extent to which all the principles are adequately catered for depends in large part 
on how responsive the person who managed the process was to the needs and concerns of those 
affected by the final outcome. An unskilled intermediary leads to distrust of the 'process and the 
outcome. 
While members of the Planning Tribunal have statutory guidelines governing their professional ' 
integrity and codes of conduct, there is no provision in the Act for professional assurance of non-
judicial intervenors. However, there has already been an Auckland-centred move to establish a 
system of accreditation for mediators by the Mediators Institute of New Zealand (Incorporated)~ 
Consentauthorities may recognise that professional training in both facilitation and mediation for 
their staff is a cost-effective investment. 
In Australia there appears to be no system for accrediting environme~tal mediators, nor is ther¢ any 
formal process whereby they are made accountable. The Family Law Court of Australia and the ' 
NSW Community Justice Centres trainandaccredit their own mt\diators (McMillan, J., 1991, Deputy 
Registrar, Land and Enviro,nment Court ofNSW; pers. comm.).· ' 
The Act does not specify in either ss.99 or 268 that the intermediary be skilled in additional dispute 
resolution. 'The Canadian legislation developed to establish a federal environment assessment 
process requires 'that Where a project is referred to mediation the Minister of the Environment 
appoints a person possessing the required knowledge or experience (House of COmmons of Canada, 
1990, pJ6). The Land and Environment Courtof New South Wales has appointed a legally qualified 
person as Deputy Registrar to undertake the role of mediator. Both he and the Registrar have been 
trained in mediation through the Australian Commercial Disputes Centre (McMillan, 1991, 
pers. comm.). An alternative could be to identify a pool of trained third-party intervenors thai the 
Planning Tribunal ,could draw from. ' 
The issues of confidentiality, privilege, and protection against defamation for non-judicial intervenors 
involved in additional dispute resolution processes are not dealt with in the Act. A third-party 
intervenor may therefore choose to draw up a contract with the parties to confer legitimacy on the' 
procedure. This should be a t~mporary measure until these issues are addressed in the legislation. 
Althoughs.268 allows a Planning Tribunal member 1:0 conduct additional dispute resolution, Judges 
may not wish to be involved, to the extent required for mediation or conciliation. They may also not 
have the appropriate training or experience. There would also be difficulties over members sitting 
on any consequent' hearing involving the same matter. ".' 
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Fairness indicators were developed for use in the pre-negotiation phase of the process. Although 
the Act allows certain persons to appeal a consent authority decision (s.120), anyone else is 
permitted to appear before the Tribunal (s.274). It is not clear how these provisions might relate 
to participation in additional dispute resolution under s . .268. 
The public-interest nature of environmental disputes requires that the interests of the public aJ;ld 
future generations need to be represented in additional dispute resolution processes.· The public 
. good could be represented by a specially-appointed public advocate as could the interests of future 
generations. Some meetings could also be made public. 
Practical experience suggests that additional dispute resolution processes are not yet working in an . 
ideal environment. Parties are often faced with making pragmatic choices constrained by a variety 
of factors. Outcomes are sometimes far frQm parties' ideals but at least the best practical option 
may emerge if they are assisted by a well-trained intervenor. Parties' perceptions of the process may 
well be influenced by a less-than-ideal outcome. . 
5.2 Recommendations 
1. That an investigation be carried out on who should pay the costs of a non-Planning Tribunal 
iIitervenor unders.268 of the Act. 
2. That resource consent authorities be encouraged through the use of professional trainers to 
p~ovide training opportu~ities for their staff in facilitation and mediation. 
, 
3. That reference be made in the Act to the need for the skills, qualities and experience required 
of the intervenor under ss.99 and 268. . 
4. That a pool of third-party' intervenors be identified, updated and available for use by the 
Planning Tribunal under s.268 of the Act. 
5. That th~ legislation be clarified with regard to who may participate under s.268. 
5.3 Future research 
There has been no attempt in this publication to provide guidance as to how principles might be 
weighted. Weighting given to the principles when monitoring or evaluating a process is often the 
outcome of a value decision. Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, p.27) point out the important trade-
off that sometimes has to be made between the attributes of fairness and efficiency. Although the 
effort of one individual may be considerably more efficient than a group process at times, 
. participation by those Jikely to be affected by the policies may be needed to gain the necessary 
support for implementation and ensure fairness. Perceived fairness, in this instance, may be the 
primary goal; efficiency may be secondary. At other times external time constraints may force parties 
to work within strict limits and efficiency becomes the primary goal. Further research could develop 
methods for weighting principles. 
An on-going evaluation of additional dispute resolution practice should be carried out, including the 
perceptions of those affected by the outcome. To assist this evaluation a data base on additional 
dispute resolution in New Zealand needs to be established by surveying those who have used these 
processes both at the local authority and Planning Tribunal levels. 
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The s.99 opportunity for resolving disputes could be better captured if there was a requirement built 
into the legislation for a formal dispute assessment to be carried out by a. person with the 
appropriate skills and experience. The assessment would determine whether a dispute was 
negotiable or non-negotiable and would assist the parties to select a cost-effective dispute resolution 
option that would afford them the greatest chance of success at. reaching agreement. Parties may 
be able to calculate the potential costs of different options but have no way of knowing what their 
chances are of realising or maximising the potential benefits, that is, of avoiding a hearing altogether. 
A 'clearing house' role such as that used in North America could be established. Research into this 
issue is very important. 
Finally, while a process might have been fair, legitimate, and efficient in the eyes of the parties 
involved, there is both private and public interest in the outcome of that process. Key indicators 
need to be developed to monitor whether outcomes achieved using additional dispute resolution are 
consistent with the purpose and principles of the Act. 
'. 
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Appendix 1 Steps in a mediation process 
Phase One: Prenegotiation 
Getting started 
_ The potential parties (those who believe their interests are likely to be affected by any 
decisions ma.de) need to be identified and contacted by the mediator. 
_ Agreement has to be reached amongst the parties to consider mediation to help resolve the 
conflict. 
_ The consensus-building process has to be described to parties. 
~ An initial meeting has to be held and other logistics discussed.· 
Representation 
_ Parties need to choose a spokesperson(s) or team leaders. 
_ . Initial parties help to identify missing groups. 
_ Strategies have to be devised for representing different interests ifthere is a large number of 
parties involved. . 
Drafting protocols, agenda setting and selecting a mediation strategy . 
_ Draft protocols have to be prepared based on past experience and the concerns of the 
parties. Ground rules and behavioural guidelines need. to be established. 
_ An agenda-setting process has to be determined. 
_ The mediator helps parties to assess approaches to conflict management. and resolution and 
then to choose an approach. 
Defining issues 
_ Issues of concern to the parties have to be identified. Agreement needs to be gained on the 
scope. of the issues; This provides a framework for the fact-finding/information~gathering 
stage. 
Joint fact-finding 
_Fact-finding/information-gathering protocols have to be established. 
_ Technical consultants, advisors etc. rieed to be identified. Relevant data about the substance 
of a coilflict are collected and analysed. Accuracy of data must be verified. 
. _ Funds have to be raised and administered in a resource pool. . 
_ The mediator can act as a repository for confidential or propriety information. 
. . 
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Ph~se Two Negotiation 
Inventing options 
_ The parties propose a range of potential options, with the mediator contributing options too. 
A lowering of commitment to fixed positions or a single alternative isencc)Uraged. 
_ Subcommittees are set up to draft options. 
Packaging . 
_ The mediator meets privately with each group to identify and test possible trades, and then 
,suggests a potential agreement package for the gro,up to consider. ' 
Written agreement 
_ The mediator works with a subcommittee to produce a draft agreement. 
_ The mediator assists in producing a procedure to create a single text. 
_ A preliminary draft of a single text is prepared. 
Binding the parties 
_ The 'mediator holds the bond, and approaches outsiders if necessary on behalf of the group. 
_ The mediator helps to invent new ways to bind the parties ro their commitments, 
Ratification 
.. The parties are helped by the mediator to 'sell' the agreement to their constituents. 
_ The mediator ensures that all representatives have been in touch with their constituents. 
Final barg~ining , . . . . . . 
ill Reaching agreement occurs either through a· gradual convergence of positions, final leaps to 
package settlements, development of a consensual formula, or establishment of a procedure to 
reach a substantive agreement. 
, Phase Three: ,Implementation or post-negotiation 
. '. '.' "' 
Linking informal agreements and formal decision making 
_ The mediator works with the parties to invent linkages. 
_ The mediator approaches elected or appointed officials on behalf of the group. 
_ The mediator identifies the legal constraints on implementation . 
. , Monitoring and e;valuntion, . 
_ The mediator serves. as the monitor of implementation and convelles a monitoring group. 
_ An evaluation procedure is es~ablished. 
Rt!negotiation ' .. 
_ The mediator reassembles. the participants if subsequent disagreements emerge, and helps to 
remind the group of its earlier intentions. 
(compiled from models by Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) and Moore (1986» 
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Appendix2 Performing a benefit-cost analysis 
Using s.32 of the Act as an exemplar, consent authorities need to assess the likely benefits and costs 
of alternative means of resolving disputes whilst evaluating their relative efficiency and effectiveness. 
Figure 1 indicates alternative means available when choosing a dispute resolution path . 
. In order to choose a path parties need_to know the nature of expected costs and benefits likely to 
be incurred when following that path. The numbers in the. shaded boxes correspond with Tables 1 
to 6. These tables list the expected costs and benefits associated with a particular option. Values 
that are not expressed in $ terms are not factored in. (An example of this could be the impact of 
improved relationships between or among parties and the time saved in not repeating another 
conflict.) Following the tables is an example of how this information can be applied in practice for 
one decision path. 
Table 1 Costs and benefits of a hearing under s.100 (ba~eline scenario). 
Costsl 
Council members' daily f~e2 
(possible three members) 
Council members' travel allowance2 
Staff time 
- administration 
- writing up decision3 
Other? 
Benefits 
Not having incurred the costs of 
mediation or facilitation (Tables 2 or 3) 
1. Generally borne by the applicant (s.36) although not always (s.36(5». 
2. Standard scale of charges. . 
3. Time taken depends on complexity of decisiC:>ll. 
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5094 Further 
information 
Figure 1 
R 
R 
s.88 AppUcation for resource consent 
5093 NotiDcation or application 
5096 CaD for submissions 
50120 Appe!d or consent authority decision to 
Planning Tribunal . 
50268 . Additional dispute resolution 
Choosing a dispute resolution path. 
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R 
not notlRcatl. 
. Minister's call~ln powers ror 
ofnatlonal 
Table 2 Costs and ben~fits of mediation under s.99 (pre-hearing meeting). 
<1" Costs! 
Intermediary2, 3 
- dispute assessment 
- mediation 
Training negotiators4 
Bringing information 
Legal advice 
Independent expert/s 
Staff time 
- administration 
- writing up decision3 
Other? . 
Benefits 
Possible. outcomes 
(i) Dispute resolved.= saving of hearing 
costS (Table 1) 
(ii) Dispute not resolved = *saving of some 
hearing cOsts (enhancement)5 
Timing' of outcome6 
1. Generally borne by applicant (s.36) although not always (s.36(5». 
2. Number of intermediaries involved (see discussion below). 
3. Duration (see discussion below). 
4. OptionaL 
5. See discussion below (paragraph 2). 
6. An outcome that is achieved quickly is of higher value than one achieved over a longer 
duration .. 
Table 3 Costs and benefits of facilitation under s.99 (pre-bearing meeting). 
Costsl 
Consent authority staff time2 
- facilitating 
- writing up decision . 
1. Generally borne by applicant. 
2. See Footnote 6 in Table 2 .. 
3. See discilssion below (paragraph 2). 
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Benefits 
Possible ou~comes 
(i) Dispute resolved = saving of hearing 
costs (Table 1) 
(ii)· DiSpute not resolved = *saving of some 
headng costs (enhancement)3 
Timing ofoutoome 
Table 4 Costs and benefits of a hearing under s.272. 
Cos.ts l 
Filing fee of appeal2 
Hearing 
- providing eyidence 
- witness fees 
- legal advice 
- producing documents (s.278) 
- party representatives appearing 
- Other? 
1. Borne by aU parties; 
2. Borne by the party appealing the decisipn. 
Benefits· 
Not having incurred costs of mediation or 
conciliation (Tables 5 or 6) 
* Saving of some hearing costs 
(enhancement)3 _ 
Timing of outcome4 
3 .. See discllssion below (par(lgraph 2). _ _ . 
4. Likely to have major impact on indicator ratio in cases of prolonged activi~y . 
Intermediary2, 3 
- dispute assessment 
- mediation 
Training negotiators4 
Administration 
Legal advice 
Independent expert 
Bringing information 
Other?, 
1 _See discussion below;-"· 
... ",' 
._,;r' 
Benefits 
Potential outcomes 
(i) Dispute resolved -= saving of hearing 
costs (Table 4) 
' .. _ :(ii). D~sputenQt !~so\v~.:::: *sClvingof sOllle ... 
hearing costs (enhancement)5 
. '.' Timirig of outcome6 
__ ,I" 
2. Number of intermediariesjnvolved (see discussion below) 
3. Who pays is not known if it is not a Planning Tribunal member .. 
4. Optional. " 
5. See discussion below {paragrapli-2).· 
6. See Footnote 6 in Table 2.· 
'.' .' • '." -,": . .! 
.- . 
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Table 6, Costs and benefits of conciliationU u~der s.268. 
Intermediary2, 3 
4 
1. See discussion below. 
Benefits 
Potential outcomes 
(i) Dispute resolved = saving of hearing 
costs (Table 4) , 
(ii) Dispute not resolved - *saving of some 
hearing costs (enhancementS) 
Speed of outcome6 : 
2. Number of intermediaries involved (see discussiOIi below). 
3. Who pays is not'known if it is not a Planning Tribunal member. 
4. Unknown because no past experience in environmental!dispute resolution fi.eld to call 
upon. 
5. See discussion below (paragraph 2). 
6. See Footnote 6 in Table 2. 
Readers will notice that costs and benefits incurred during mediation under ss.99 (Table 2) and 268, 
(Table 5) do not differ greatly. The main difference is that under s.99 the consent applicant could 
be required to pay for costs incurred by the consent authority (s.36) whereas each party would pay 
for its own administrative costs under s.268. . 
In Tables 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 there is a Benefit marked (*). This represents a situation where the 
dispute is not resolved but where there is the potential for an 'enhanced'hearing situation. The 
issues may have been clarified using additional dispute resolution and this has the potential to 
reduce the hearing time needed. The, presence of this benefit needs to be monitored over time and 
parties may choose to adjust their list of benefits as a result. 
A number of issues need to be taken into account when calculating expected costs and benefits of 
additional dispute resolution processes. The following discussion relates to points raised in 
connection with the Tables above. 
The applicant must consent to the course of action under s.99 of the Act because administrative 
charges relating to resource consent applications are generally payaQle by the applicant in accordance 
with s.36. However, s.36(5) allows the local authority discretion to remit the whole {)r any part of 
the charge. ' 
The applicant would need additional information when deciding whether to pursue mediation or 
facilitation. ,With mediation, a significant amount of time may be spent in the pre-negotiation/-
mediation phase (see Appendix 1). Bingham (Ibid., p.xxii) found that "(a)' particularly important 
reason for the relatively high success rate in the dispute resolution efforts ... is that the mediators 
conducted dispute assessments at the beginning of each case as a first step in helping the parties 
decide whether to proceed with a voluntary dispute resolution process .... ". This requires adequate 
resources, time, and skilled personnel both to work with the parties, and, to provide, technical 
11 Readers are reminded that (a) lhe term conciliation has come from the industrial relations field and that there is 
no experience to call upon in the environmental dispute resolution field and (b) both mediation and conciliation 
have probably been used to empower a,range of additional dispute resolution processes in s.268 of the Act rather 
than applying in a strict technical sense. 
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information. Although relatively high initial investments may have to be made, this can result in 
significant:ly greater benefits in the long run as acceptable, workable outcomes avoid the need for 
hearings in the future (Ministry for the Environment, 1988, p.8). 
Several important issues are apparent here. First, if a hearing of an application for a resource 
consent is to be held, the date for the commencement of that hearing is to be no more than 25 
working days from the closing date for submissions on the application (s.101(2». Because of the 
nature of the involvement of a mediator and the time required to conduct a dispute assessment and 
to carry out the tasks in the pre-mediation/negotiation stage (see Appendix 1) insufficient time'might 
be available to reach agreement although issues could be Significantly clarified. Consensus building 
can seem inefficient and unproductive initially; it can be time-consuming, expensive, and 
unproductive (Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, pp.216-217). 
Second, the resources required initially for media~ion may deter pursuit of this option within this 
timeframe. However, a high potential value can be attributed to the carrying out of a dispute 
assessment before the choice is made as to a particular dispute resolution process. At present there 
is no formal requirement under ss.99 and 268 for a dispute assessment to be carried out by a person 
with the necessary skills and experience. 
A further issue ~elates to the complexity of the dispute. If there are a number of complex issues, 
several different types of parties, and a large degree of polarisation between or amongst the parties, 
the intervenor may require assistance with information gathering and ordering, for example, and 
. concentrate on man~ging the process only. 
In Tables 5 and 6 two issues arise over costs. In the event that a Planning Tribunal member chooses 
to invite a non-member intervenor to be involved under s.268 a decision has to be made as to who 
should pay for this intervenor. Second, s.285 allows .one party to seek to have costs awarded against 
. another. There is no indication as to how this provision might apply under s.268. 
One difficulty in assessing different dispute resolution opportunities is the uncertainty surrounding 
the outcome, particularly with regard to the open-endedness of the time frames relating to ss.268 
and 272 .. The probability of not achieving resolution is a problem. In her review of environmental 
dispute resolution in the United States; Bingham (1986, p.141) was encouraged to find that "parties 
took significantly less time to conclude cases in which they failed to agree, indicating that, in 
calculating the risks of failure when' considering a mediation option, parties need not· be overly 
concerned about wasting their time". 
Calculating a benefit-cost ratio 
It is recommended that a marginal analysis be undertaken of the costs and benefits relative to the 
scenario based on moving directly to hearings under ss.100 or 272. As such, the costs and benefits 
identified below Should be considered as additional costs and additional benefits including cost 
savings arising from the process selected. 
One possible pathway illustrated in Figure 1 will be used to illustrate how a benefit-cost ratio can . 
be calculated. The scenario chosen is marked with a bolder line and larger arrows. The first step 
is using one of the options available under s.99, namely facilitation. The dispute is not resolved but 
the issues are clarified before proceeding to a hearing (s.100). The consent authority decision is 
appealed by one of the parties. The parties choose to try mediation under s.268 before going to a 
hearing unper s.272. The dispute is resolved and the need for a hearing is avoided. Table 7 
illustrates the expected costs and benefits involved in this scenario. The column totals marked with 
a solid dash. represent the total costs and benefits that will feature in the benefit-cost ratio. 
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Using the method shown here, the benefit-cost ratio for each major option should be calculated. 
A cost-effective process is one where any value greater than one is an improvement <?vet. the 
baseline. The path that should be chosen is the one with the ratio that maximises expected marginal 
benefits relative to expected marginal costs. 
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Table 7 Calculating the benefits and costs or one dispute resolution scenario. 
L88 
AppID 
Appln 
fee 
a.93 
Notifa 
.. 95 
SubmiIIL 
.. 99 
Pre-bc:uiDc mCcciac 
2S working days 
f!£i.!i.m 
Council staff 
(set rate of 
charges) 
Table 3 
Mediation 
Intermediary 
Training negot. 
Bringing 
information 
Legal advice 
Indep. expen/s 
Staff time: 
Adminis~tion 
Write up 
Decision 
Other? 
Table 2 
Total oosts andbenelits that. fea1ure in the benelit-COSl ratio . 
dOO 
CoaIeDt aulbority 
bcariJJc 
Council members' 
daily fee and 
travel allowance 
Council staff: 
Administration 
Write up 
decision 
Others 
Table 1 
Saving of some 
hearing oosts 
(enhanced) 
.. 121 a.268 
Appeal Admlioaal dispute raoIutioo 
Plan. Trib •. 
Appeal fee' 
Mediation 
Intermediary 
Training 
negotiators 
Administration 
Legal advice . 
Independent 
expert 
Bringing 
. information 
Other? 
TableS 
RESOLVED 
Save Planning 
Tribunal hearing 
oosts ••• 
£2!!E!!l 
Inter-
mediary 
Table 6 
. a.ZT2 
PIaDniDg Tribunal bc:ariD& 
a.299 
Appeal 10 
HiP Court 
•••• Refer 
8c:Dcfi1a 
Provide cvid. 
Witness fees 
Legal advice 
Producing 
documents 
Party reps 
appearing 
Other? 
Table 4 
I~;;n!!~!!~~!l I 
i4J~ •••• II~ .. 
:::=:=::;:::;=::::: 
Appendix 3 . Improving the probability of increased benefits with 
additional dispute resolution 
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